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Abstract
This paper estimates the effects of technology shocks in VAR models of the U.S., iden-
tiﬁed by imposing restrictions on the sign of impulse responses. These restrictions are con-
sistent with the implications of a popular class of DSGE models, with both real and nominal
frictions, and with sufﬁciently wide ranges for their parameters. This identiﬁcation strat-
egy thus substitutes theoretically-motivated restrictions for the atheoretical assumptions
on the time-series properties of the data that are key to long-run restrictions. Stochastic
technology improvements persistently increase real wages, consumption, investment and
output in the data; hours worked are very likely to increase, displaying a hump-shaped pat-
tern. Contrary to most of the related VAR evidence, results are not sensitive to a number of
speciﬁcation assumptions, including those on the stationarity properties of variables.
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An important task of macroeconomics is to develop models that account for speciﬁc, quantita-
tive features of the business cycle. Modern business cycle theory, emanating from the seminal
work of Kydland and Prescott [1982], envisions a central role of random ﬂuctuations in tech-
nological progress in driving the bulk of aggregate ﬂuctuations. Precisely, when technology
shocks as volatile and persistent as estimated total factor productivity (TFP) are fed through a
standard real business cycle (RBC) model, the simulated economy appears to be able to repli-
cate the patterns of unconditional volatilities and cross-correlations of key macroeconomic time
series of the postwar U.S. economy (e.g., see King and Rebelo [1999]). This is a remarkable
result for, as stressed by Uhlig [2003b], alternative, “demand-driven theories need to be worked
pretty hard to cough up” key business cycle facts like the strong unconditional procyclicality of
both labor productivity and hours worked.
The notion that technology shocks have anything to do with business cycles, however, has
been recently questioned by a growing literature that aims at testing the predictions of the theory
in terms of conditional moments in the data, i.e. conditional on technology shocks being the
source of ﬂuctuations. Gal´ ı [1999] originally identiﬁed technology shocks with structural VAR
methods as the only source of a unit root in labor productivity. His results show that a positive
technology shock induces a fall in hours worked so persistent that a negative conditional corre-
lation between output and hours worked ensues. As stressed by Gal´ ı [1999], not only does this
evidence, taken at face value, reject a key prediction of standard RBC theory, but it highlights
a feature of the economy’s response to aggregate technology shocks whose relevance goes be-
yond any speciﬁc macroeconomic paradigm. Because of the procyclicality of hours worked,
some other shock(s) rather than technology shocks must be driving observed aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions.2 While initially the structural VAR literature reached conclusions similar to Gal´ ı [1999]
1 We would like to thank an anonymous referee, Gianni Amisano, Fabio Canova, Larry Christiano, Marty
Eichenbaum, Jesus Fern´ andez-Villaverde, Luigi Guiso, Bart Mackowiak, Chris Otrok, Alessandro Secchi, Cristo-
pher Sims, Andrea Tiseno, Harald Uhlig and Mike Woodford, along with seminar participants at the Bank of Italy,
the European University Institute, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Humboldt University, Universitat
Pompeu Fabra, the 1st EABCN Conference held at the ECB, and the 2004 SED Meetings, for many helpful com-
ments and suggestions. Part of this project was carried out while the ﬁrst author was afﬁliated with the Bank
of Italy, whose support is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the au-
thors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy or the European Central Bank. Correspondence:
luca.dedola@ecb.int; stefano.neri@bancaditalia.it.
2 Other recent contributions that, using different methodologies, have called into question the role of technol-
ogy shocks in driving business cycles include Basu, Fernald and Kimball [1998] and Shea [1998]. See Christiano,8
(e.g., see Francis and Ramey [2003]), the result that hours fall after a technology improvement
has been disputed by several recent contributions, either challenging its robustness or radically
questioning the “credibility” of long-run restrictions for identifying technology shocks.3
This paper reconsiders the important VAR evidence on the dynamic effects of technol-
ogy shocks by proposing an identiﬁcation scheme based on model-consistent sign restrictions.
When this methodology is applied to the U.S. postwar data, an unexpected improvement in
technology is found to lead to a signiﬁcant and persistent rise in labor productivity, real wages,
output, consumption and investment, and, in line with the predictions of standard RBC models,
it is much more likely to drive hours worked up, not down.4 With a 4/5 probability, a typical
shock will increase U.S. hours worked per capita after one year. In addition, these results are
consistent with the view that technology shocks play an important role in accounting for output
ﬂuctuations, although the uncertainty surrounding the contributions of these shocks to the vari-
ance of the forecast errors is large. Technology shocks, however, leave unexplained most of the
variation in hours worked.5
The paper’s contribution is twofold. First, in contrast to most of the VAR literature, technol-
ogy shocks are identiﬁed by means of restrictions on the sign of impulse responses, similarly
to the approach proposed by Canova and De Nicol´ o [2002], Faust [1998] and Uhlig [2001]
for monetary policy shocks.6 Differently from those contributions, however, the degree of ag-
nosticism inherent in this kind of restrictions explicitly reﬂects uncertainty over the precise
parameters values of a class of widely used dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, en-
compassing most frictions proposed in the macroeconomic literature — like habits formation in
consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capacity utilization and nominal rigidities
inpricesandwages(e.g., seeChristiano, EichenbaumandEvans[2003]). Thesemodels, though
Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2004] for some contrarian evidence.
3 For an exhaustive survey of this large literature, beyond the selected contributions mentioned below, see Gal´ ı
and Rabanal [2004] and the comments by McGrattan [2004] and Ramey [2004].
4 In the working paper version, Dedola and Neri [2004], we report broadly similar results also for Japan and
(West) Germany.
5 See Kydland [1995] for a survey of the literature addressing the well-known fact that hours worked are too
volatile in the data, relative to the predictions of standard RBC models.
6 Several recent papers question whether one can properly identify technology shocks using long-run restric-
tions. For instance, Fisher [2002] and Uhlig [2003a, b] have convincingly argued that a unit root in labor produc-
tivity may result from permanent shocks other than the standard RBC shock to TFP, like shocks to the efﬁciency of
investment, affecting the rate of transformation between current consumption and productive capital in the future,
and to the capital income tax, respectively. Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust [2004] and Chari, Kehoe and McGrat-
tan [2004] assess with Monte Carlo experiments the ability of long-run restrictions to recover the true impulse
responses when applied to simulated data from calibrated models.9
implying that across all parameterizations the responses of several variables to a positive shock
to technology be positive for a number of quarters, are inconclusive concerning the effects on
hours worked. The latter can either increase or fall depending on the values of key preference
and technology parameters, independently of the presence of nominal rigidities.7 Thus, while
models with different implications are conceivable, these restrictions are likely to enjoy a fairly
broad support, as they are derived for a wide range of parameterizations. Moreover, the sign
restrictions we impose are weak in the sense that they lead to a plurality of candidate structural
impulse responses. Rather than as a shortcoming, this is a potentially important advantage of
this approach, for it eschews exact restrictions, such as exclusion restrictions, that are likely
not to be robust to small perturbations to model speciﬁcation and parameterization. For in-
stance, our restrictions are valid independently of the fact that technology shocks be exactly
nonstationary and the only source of a stochastic trend in labor productivity. Therefore, the full
speciﬁcation of the stochastic structure and long-run properties of the VAR model that is an
essential part of structural VARs with long-run restrictions is not needed in our analysis.
In this respect, the paper’s second contribution is to the debate in the VAR literature on
the robustness of the evidence on the effects of technology shocks. Several recent papers have
shown that the key ﬁndings in Gal´ ı [1999] are extremely sensitive to a number of auxiliary
speciﬁcation assumptions, including the selection of the speciﬁc variables entering the VAR
and their transformation, and the data sample considered. As argued by Cooley and Dwyer
[1998], long-run restrictions critically hinge on a careful distinction between the almost obser-
vationally equivalent trend- and difference-stationarity of the variables included in the VAR.
Misspeciﬁcation of these auxiliary assumptions, although inconsequential for many purposes,
could severely impinge on the estimated dynamics of the VAR model. Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Vigfusson [2003] give empirical content to this critique, documenting that the sign of the
response of labor inputs to technology shocks identiﬁed with the same long-run restrictions as
in Gal´ ı [1999] and Francis and Ramey [2003] is positive when hours worked per capita are
assumed to be stationary and thus enter the VAR in levels, rather than in ﬁrst differences as in
the latter contributions.
This result has been conﬁrmed by Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004], who, however, raise a fur-
ther issue, showing that the response of labor inputs is always negative when per capita hours
worked are included in levels but detrended by (these authors’ preferred) quadratic trend, or
when instead total hours worked are used without a normalization by working age popula-
7 As discussed in Section 3 below, Francis and Ramey [2003] argue that real business cycle models, suitably
modiﬁed to allow for habit formation and capital adjustment costs, may be consistent with Gal´ ı’s [1999] ﬁndings.
The latter contribution originally suggested nominal rigidities as the most natural explanation for the negative
response of hours worked.10
tion — regardless of the assumed deterministic or stochastic trend (see also Ramey [2004]).
Moreover, contributions like Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es [2003] have shown that the effects
of technology shocks estimated with long-run restrictions change drastically between the two
sample periods before and after the early 1980’s, in coincidence with the beginning of Paul
Volcker’s tenure at the helm of the Federal Reserve System. Precisely, a positive technology
shock identiﬁed as in Gal´ ı [1999] brings about a decline in hours worked in the subsample up
to the early 1980’s, against a rise afterwards. These authors attribute this difference to a change
in systematic monetary policy.8
In light of these diverse and contrasting ﬁndings, it is not unjustiﬁed to conclude that results
on the effects of technology shocks estimated with long-run restrictions have been shown to
be a rather mixed bag. By contrast, our results are not sensitive to a number of speciﬁcation
assumptions. First, we show that our ﬁndings are not affected by transformation of the variables
— notably both per capita and total hours worked — in levels or ﬁrst differences. Second, we
document the robustness of the results to different sample periods, and to the adoption of a
diffuse prior on the reduced form coefﬁcients of the VAR entertained in our Bayesian inferential
approach. Third, we argue that our approach is very unlikely to mix up technology shocks
with other shocks that may entail a (more) positive response of labor inputs, like monetary
policy shocks, price markup shocks and investment-efﬁciency shocks, as results are robust to
imposing further restrictions to better rule out this possibility. Finally, we conclude showingthat
even when we focus on those (relatively unlikely) structural impulse vectors that explain a large
fraction of labor productivity in the long run, we always ﬁnd that hours worked, regardless of
how uncertain their response on impact might be, sharply rise after a few quarters with a hump-
shaped pattern. Overall, these results lend strong support to the view that theory-based (sign)
restrictions are helpful in avoiding many of the subtle speciﬁcation issues that arise when using
long-run restrictions.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the identiﬁcation
approach with sign restrictions, while Section 3 brieﬂy presents the benchmark model, report-
ing the theoretical impulse responses of a selected vector of variables that are used to identify
technology shocks. Section 4 illustrates the results of the VAR analysis in terms of impulse re-
8 However, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003] ﬁnd that also this result depends on the transfor-
mation of hours worked used to remove the assumed trend. Dotsey [1999] ﬁrst argued that with sticky prices the
response of labor inputs to technology shocks crucially depends on whether the systematic response of monetary
policy is accommodative.
9 In the working paper version, Dedola and Neri [2004], we also investigate whether our approach has any in-
herent bias toward ﬁnding an increase in hours worked. Our results show that, when applied to simulated data from
a model parameterized so that hours worked fall after a technology shock, the correct negative sign is recovered.11
sponses and variance decomposition. In Section 5 the differences between our results and those
in the VAR literature are investigated. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding observations.
2 The identiﬁcation framework with sign restrictions
In this section, we brieﬂy describe our strategy to estimate the dynamic effects of technology
shocks by means of sign restrictions, following Canova and De Nicol´ o [2002], and especially
Uhlig [2001]. Both approaches yield nearly identical results when applied to identifying tech-
nology shocks with our sign restrictions. It is well-known that the reduced form of a VAR of
order p has the following standard representation (omitting a constant c):
Yt = B (L)Yt¡1 + Ut;
where the vector Y includes the variables of interest in levels and B (L) is a lag polynomial of
order p. The covariance matrix of the vector of reduced-form residuals Ut is denoted as Σ. The
reduced form can be estimated consistently using ordinary least squares, which, conditional on
Gaussian Ut and initial conditions, is equal to the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimator. Iden-
tiﬁcation in the structural VAR literature amounts to providing enough restrictions to uniquely
solve — up to an orthonormal transformation — for the following decomposition of the n £ n




This deﬁnes a one-to-one mapping from the vector of orthogonal structural shocks V to the
reduced form residuals U, U = A0V: Because of the latter orthogonality assumption, and the
symmetry of Σ, at least
n(n¡1)
2 restrictions on A0 need to be imposed.10
The j-th column of the identifying matrix A0, aj, is called an impulse vector in Rn, as it
maps the innovation to the j-th structural shock Vj into the contemporaneous, impact responses
of all the n variables, Ψ0. With the structural impulse vector aj in hand, the set of all structural
impulse responses of the n variables up to the horizon k; Ψ1;:::;Ψk can then be computed using




Bs¡iΨi; s ¸ 1;Bi¡s = 0;s ¡ i ¸ p;
Ψ0 = aj:
Proposition 1 in Uhlig [2001] shows that, given an arbitrary decomposition A0 of the ma-
trix Σ; any structural impulse vector aj arising from a given identifying matrix A0 can be
10 E.g., see Hamilton [1994], chapter 11.12
represented as A0q; for an appropriate vector q belonging to the hypersphere of unitary radius
Sn ½ Rn.11 For instance, natural candidates for the arbitrary decomposition A0 are either the
eigenvalue-eigenvector or the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. The basic idea of sign restrictions
can thus be described as attributing equal probability to all possible structural impulse vectors
aj which, for a given reduced form estimate of the VAR, yield impulses responses whose signs
are consistent with the assumed ones. Operationally, it is convenient to characterize the set
of all consistent impulse responses by simulation, using the following algorithm suggested by
Uhlig [2001]. For a given estimate of the VAR reduced-form matrices Σ and B(L), yielding an
arbitrary A0; draw (a large number of) candidate q vectors from a uniform distribution over Sn,
compute the associated impulse vector aj and impulse response matrix Ψ; discarding those that
do not satisfy the assumed sign restrictions.
As argued by Uhlig [2001], the Bayesian approach, viewing the reduced-form VAR param-
eters as random variables, is particularly suited to interpreting and implementing sign restric-
tions. From a Bayesian point of view, sign restrictions amount to attributing probability zero
to reduced-form parameter realizations giving rise to impulse responses which contravene the
restrictions. To the extent that these restrictions do not lead to over-identiﬁcation, they impose
no constraint on the reduced form of the VAR. We can thus use standard Bayesian methods
for estimation and inference, obtaining measures of the statistical reliability of estimated im-
pulse responses. As shown by Uhlig [2001], under a standard diffuse prior on the VAR reduced
form parameters B (L) and Σ, and assuming a Gaussian likelihood for the data sample at hand,
the posterior density of the reduced-form VAR parameters with the type of restrictions we im-
plement will be just proportional to a standard Normal-Wishart. Therefore it is possible to
draw from the posterior distribution of impulse responses consistent with our sign restrictions
by jointly drawing from the Normal-Wishart posterior for Σ, B (L) and the uniform over Sn,
discarding the realizations that violate the restrictions.12
It should be kept in mind that, as stressed by Uhlig [2001], the sign restriction approach
amounts to simultaneously estimating the coefﬁcients of the reduced-form VAR and the impulse
vector. Draws of the VAR parameters from their unrestricted posterior which do not permit any
impulse vector to satisfy the imposed sign restrictions are discarded as they receive zero prior
weight. Therefore, below we check that our empirical results are not driven by the diffuse prior
on the VAR reduced form, but mainly depend on our identifying assumptions.
11 As stressed by Canova and De Nicol´ o [2002], more generally any identifying matrix A0 can be expressed as
the product of an arbitrary A0 time a speciﬁc orthonormal matrix Q; such that Q0Q = I. Thus, the q in Uhlig’s
[2001] proposition is effectively the j-th column of the above Q matrix.
12 Concretely, to draw from this posterior we use the program montevar described in the RATS manual (see
Rats User Guide, Estima [2000]).13
The procedure outlined above allows one to obtain estimates of impulse responses consis-
tent with a given set of assumed sign restrictions, under the standard assumption in the structural
VAR literature that all the structural shocks are orthogonal. Without any kind of a priori knowl-
edge, it would be reasonable to assume a multivariate ﬂat prior over the support of all possible
responses Ψ0;Ψ1;:::;Ψk, given by an hypersphere in Rnk centered in 0. Economic theory can
then be brought to bear, as in Canova and De Nicol´ o [2002] and Uhlig [2001], to shift all the
probability mass to the event that the responses of m · n variables (e.g., labor productivity,
investment and so on) to the speciﬁc structural shock of interest have a given (positive or neg-
ative) sign for s · k quarters. Clearly, this must also be the only shock that satisﬁes the sign
restrictions. For instance, Uhlig [2001], by appealing to conventional wisdom, assumes that a
contractionary monetary policy shock in the U.S. uniquely brings about a hike in the Federal
Fund rate, a drop in the price level and a contraction in non-borrowed reserves. Differently from
the previous contributions, in the next section we instead derive those sign restrictions from a
class of DSGE models that most participants in the literature would accept, and explicitly take
into account possible disagreement over parameter values, e.g. on the importance of nominal
rigidities and other frictions, by simulating from a distribution function over these parameters,
reasonably reﬂecting the degree of uncertainty over them. We also use the same model to argue
that technology shocks uniquely satisfy the set of sign restrictions we use in the estimation.
3 Labor inputs dynamics in a benchmark DSGE model with
real and nominal frictions
In this section we describe the model that is used as a laboratory to analyze the response of a
set of variables to technology shocks. The model is basically the one estimated with different
methods by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2003] for the U.S. and Smets and Wouters
[2003] for the euro area. It features both real rigidities, in the form of adjustment costs for
investment and variable capacity utilization, and nominal rigidities, namely sticky prices and
wages. To save on space, we present only the linearized equations of the model, following the
convention that a hat denotes deviations of variables either from their baseline long-run growth
path (e.g. real consumption) or from their steady state (e.g. inﬂation). We will then consider
impulse responses to technology shocks.13 Since we are interested in implications in terms of
13 We only focus on impulse responses to these shocks because the model has implications that would allow
us to disentangle other shocks considered in the literature, like labor supply shocks (akin to labor tax rate shocks),
markup shocks and preference shocks, from technology shocks. To save on space we do not report these impulse
responses, that are available upon request.14
the signs of the responses of variables that are robust across a broad range of parameterizations
of the model, with and without nominal rigidities, we ﬁnd it useful to assume that all structural
parameters are uniformly and independently distributed over sufﬁciently wide ranges. However,
very similar implications in terms of the sign of impulse responses would obtain if, to represent
uncertainty over parameters, we used the posterior distribution estimated with Bayesian tech-
niques, for example as in Smets and Wouters [2003].14 A notable advantage of our approach,
given the fundamental uncertainty on the best way to model the long-run behavior of hours in
the U.S., is that it leaves this behavior unspeciﬁed in the model, as preferences are not restricted
so that hours be stationary along the balanced growth path. This is consistent with our level
speciﬁcation of the VAR, that is agnostic on the best way to model the long-run properties of
the data.
3.1 A benchmark DSGE model
The explicit consideration of a balanced growth path in which per capita real variables grow
at the rate 1 + g implies that the subjective discount factor ¯ in the linearized economy has
to satisfy the following restriction, ¯ = b(1 + g)
1¡¾c, as shown by King and Rebelo [1999],
where b 2 [0:985;0:995] is the discount factor in the level economy, implying an interest rate
between 2% and 6.5% per annum — this latter value is the one assumed in King and Rebelo
[1999]. We set g = 0:004; equal to the trend in U.S. labor productivity per hour worked over the
1955:1-2001:4 period. This implies a 1.6% annual growth rate in per capita output, investment
and consumption.
Fluctuations in the model economy around the balanced growth path are driven by the stan-
dard RBC technology shock affecting total factor productivity, ²z; and by an investment-speciﬁc
technology shock, ²i (see Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman [1988], and Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Krusell [2000]).15 As is customary in the macro literature, both shocks are assumed
to have an autoregressive representation of order one with a coefﬁcient ½j 2 [0:75;1]; j = z;i.
This parameterization encompasses the case of an economy with unit root shocks to productiv-
14 This is the approach followed by Peersman and Straub [2004], who use the signs implied for some variables
by the posterior distribution of impulses responses estimated by Smets and Wouters [2003] to identify shocks in a
VAR of the euro area.
15 In a previous version of the paper we also illustrated the effects of shocks to capital income taxation, which
have been suggested by some authors (e.g., Uhlig [2003a]) as posing a problem in identifying technology shock
with long-run restrictions. Since these shocks bring about very similar effects to those arising from investement
speciﬁc shocks, we do not report results on them. However, we will return to this issue in Section 5, when dicussing
the robustness of our results.15
ity; however the latter behavior is basically indistinguishable, in samples of the length of the
U.S. postwar period, from that induced by values close to the upper bound of the assumed range
of the autoregressive coefﬁcients. Notice that at this stage we do not need to take a stand on
the standard deviation of the shocks innovations, as the sign of the impulse responses will be
invariant to it.
We consider both types of technology shocks for the following reason. In contrast to the
standard RBC technology shock, ²i
t does not have any immediate impact on the production
function. Instead, it affects the rate of transformation between current consumption and pro-
ductive capital in the future. Thus, any effects on current output must be the result of the ability
of that shock in eliciting a change in the quantity of input services hired by ﬁrms. As argued by
Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004], this implies that in a model with nominal rigidities ²z and ²i can have
different effects on hours worked but similar effects on the other variables of interest, like output
and, through an increase in capacity utilization, labor productivity. Therefore, it is important to
investigate whether these two different kinds of technology shocks can be distinguished on the
basis of their dynamic effects on a larger set of variables.16
Given our assumption of separability between consumption and leisure, the Euler equation











ˆ Rt ¡ Etˆ ¼t+1
´
(1)
where the parameter h 2 [0:0;0:8] measures the degree of habit formation, and the parameter
¾c 2 [1:0;10] measures the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consump-
tion (i.e., the risk aversion coefﬁcient). The assumed ranges encompass most valued used and
estimated in the literature. For instance the largest point estimate of h reported by Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans [2003] is 0.71 (with a standard error of 0.03); these authors also set
¾c = 1. The variables ˆ Rt and ˆ ¼t+1 denote the nominal short-term interest rate and the inﬂation
rate, respectively, that in the RBC economy are separately determined by the monetary policy
rule, with no feedback to real variables.
16 The argument in Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004] is made informally in the context of a sticky price version of
a model like that of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell [2000], assuming for simplicity that the relationship
yt = mt ¡ pt holds in equilibrium, and that both mt and pt are pre-determined relative to the shock. In that
case ﬁrms will want to produce the same quantity of the good but, in contrast with the case of neutral technology
shocks, in order to do so they will need to employ the same level of inputs since the efﬁciency of the latter has not
been affected (only newly purchased capital goods will enhance that productivity in the future). Notice, however,
that to increase investment and reap the beneﬁt of the shock, consumption will have to decline, given that output is
ﬁxed.16
Because of adjustment costs, households choose the level of investment and capital accord-





















where ˆ qt is the price of installed capital goods in terms of consumption goods (Tobin’s q), ˆ {t is
the level of investment, Â 2 [0:0;5:0] is the inverse of the elasticity of investment to the price
of capital goods. The parameter Â is inversely related to the steady state value of the second
derivative of the investment adjustment cost function. The largest point estimate in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans [2003] for this parameter is 3.24 (with a standard error of 0.47).
The optimal choice for the stock of capital is given by:
ˆ qt = ¡
³
ˆ Rt ¡ Etˆ ¼t+1
´
+ ¯ (1 ¡ ±)Etˆ qt+1 + ¯rEtˆ rt+1 (3)
where ˆ rt (r) is (the steady state value of) the rental price of capital (determined solely by ¯
and ±), and ± is the depreciation rate, usually assumed to be equal to 0:025 in the RBC litera-
ture (see Cooley and Prescott [1995]). Because of variable capacity utilization, the following
approximate relation exists between the rental rate of capital and capacity, b ut:
Ãˆ rt = b ut; (4)
where Ã 2 [0:0;50] is the elasticity of capital utilization with respect to the rental rate of capital.
Thus, a zero value of Ã corresponds to the standard case in which capacity does not adjust. This
parameter is not estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2003], but set to 100 a priori.








b it = ®b kt + (1 ¡ ®) b lt + ®Ãb rt + b ²
z
t
b kt+1 = ±b it + (1 ¡ ±) b kt;
where the variable ˆ ²z
t represents the standard technology shock shifting the production possi-
bility frontier, ˆ lt is hours worked per capita, ˆ kt is the capital stock, while ® is the capital share
in the (Cobb-Douglas) production function, usually assumed to be around 1=3 in the RBC lit-
erature (see Cooley and Prescott [1995]). Notice that because of variable capacity utilization
aggregate output is a function of the return on capital ˆ rt.
Nominal rigidities are introduced in the form of both wage and price stickiness. Households
choose the level of nominal wage for the type of labor they supply in order to maximize their17
intertemporal utility function. As shown by Smets and Wouters [2003], the log-linearization of




























ˆ wt ¡ ¾lˆ lt ¡
¾c
1 ¡ h
(ˆ ct ¡ hˆ ct¡1)
¸
(5)
where ˆ wt is the real wage. The parameter »w 2 [0:0;0:8] measures the probability that the wage
is not reoptimized in every period. The higher this parameter, the more sticky wages will be.
The lagged term of the real wage ˆ wt¡1 is introduced assuming that wages that are not chosen
optimally are indexed to last period inﬂation rate. The parameter °w 2 [0:0;1:0] measures
the degree of indexation of wages to last period inﬂation. The larger this parameter, the more
nominal wages are persistent. Clearly, the standard Euler equation for the labor choice under
ﬂexible wages, appearing in the above equation in brackets, is obtained by setting »w = °w = 0.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2003], while setting °w = 1; report estimates of »w within
the above range, with a maximum value equal to 0.8: The parameter ¾l 2 [0:0;10] measures the
inverse of the elasticity of the labor supply. Finally, ¸w 2 [0:0;1:0] measures the wage-setter





















is derived by linearizing the ﬁrst order condition of the optimization problem of monopolistic
competitive ﬁrms who choose the price to be set in order to maximize the expected discounted
stream of future proﬁts (see Smets and Wouters [2003]).
Allowing ﬁrms that do not reoptimize their price to adjust it to last period inﬂation rate
delivers an equation in which current inﬂation depends on last period inﬂation. The parameter
»p 2 [0:0;0:8] measures the probability the price of a good is not reoptimized in the current
period. The higher this parameter, the more prices will be sticky. The parameter °p 2 [0:0;1:0]
measures the degree of indexation of prices. The larger this parameter, the more inﬂation is
persistent. Again, setting »p = °p = 0 recovers the standard expression for marginal costs
with ﬂexible prices and Cobb-Douglas production function, in brackets in the above equation.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [2003], while setting °w = 1; report a maximum estimate of
»p equal to 0.92, but argue that this value is way to high given the evidence on individual price
changes in Bils and Klenow [2002], implying that ﬁrms change prices roughly every 5 months
on average. Therefore we set the upper limit to 0.8 — implying that the average duration of
prices is 5 quarters at most.18
Finally, the monetary authority sets the short-term interest rate according to the following
Taylor rule:
ˆ Rt = (1 ¡ ½r)½yˆ yt + (1 ¡ ½r)½¼ˆ ¼t + ½r ˆ Rt¡1; (7)
with parameters ½r 2 [0:0;0:99];½y 2 [¡0:25;0:25];½¼ 2 [1:1;2:0]; encompassing most values
considered in the literature.
3.2 Deducing sign restrictions on impulse responses
We now present and discuss the impulse responses of the model’s variables to the above two
types of productivity shocks, with a view to deriving identifying restrictions on their sign. This
identiﬁcation strategy for VARs is very much in line with the methodology outlined by Canova
[2002]. We assume that all structural parameters are uniformly and independently distributed
over sufﬁciently wide ranges. Table 1 summarizes the ranges of the uniform distributions for
the parameters of the model including real and nominal frictions. As argued above, these ranges
cover reasonable values for the parameters, encompassing most calibrated and also estimated
values used in the literature. Clearly, the distribution for the RBC model augmented with real
frictions can be viewed as a particular case in which the (degenerate) density functions over the
relevant parameters (namely, »p;°p;»w;°w;¸w,½r;½y;½¼) have all the probability mass concen-
trated at zero.
In principle, the uniform densities on structural parameters would transpire into a pattern of
the distribution of impulse responses that has richer implications than the sign restrictions we
use in recovering structural shocks in the data. However, two considerations lead us to focus on
sign restrictions only. First, the latter are more likely to be robust to changes in the speciﬁcation
of the functional form of the distributions of the structural parameters of the model economy.
The sign restrictions we impose are broadly similar to those that would be obtained by estimat-
ing the parameters’ posterior distribution of the model with Bayesian methods, as in Smets and
Wouters [2003]. In this sense the uniform distribution on parameters can be thought as a conve-
nient device to put discipline on the derivation of sign restrictions on impulse responses, without
having to carry out the estimation of a complete model, which would require to take a stand on
a number of speciﬁcation issues, like the number of shocks and the appropriate detrending of
the data. Indeed, when we estimated the model as in Smets and Wouters [2003] using our set
of variables, we found that the impulse responses to a positive technology shock have signs
that are consistent with those obtained with the uniform densities, but for hours worked. The
latter actually fall with more than a 95 percent probability. Second, it is computationally more
viable to impose sign restrictions in the context of Bayesian VARs, rather than a whole shape
of the implied distribution of impulse responses, thus allowing us to use standard methods for19
estimation and inference, thus facilitating comparisons with most of the VAR literature.
In order to derive robust implications for the responses to technology shocks we carried
out the following Monte Carlo simulation. We drew a large number of vectors of parameters
from the uniform densities reported in Table 1 for the RBC model and the model with nominal
rigidities (henceforth NR). For each draw we saved the responses to a one per cent positive
neutral technology and investment-efﬁciency shock, and computed the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles
of their distributions point-by point. This ensures that parameters combinations that bring about
extreme responses in the tails are ruled out.17
The results are reported in Figures 1A to 1D, displaying impulse responses up to 20 quarters.
From Figures 1A and 1B, presenting the dynamic effects of a 1 percent positive shock to ²z
t; it is
clear that neutral technology shocks have qualitatively similar effects on real variables irrespec-
tive of nominal rigidities. Labor productivity, real wages, output, investment and consumption
increase for several quarters. However, these positive responses can be more or less persistent,
and revert to steady state more or less slowly, reﬂecting our rather uninformative densities over
both the parameters governing the internal propagation mechanism and the serial correlation of
the shocks. Moreover, for both the RBC and NR model, hours worked can either fall or rise de-
pending on the parameterization, not only on impact but up to 20 quarters after the shock, with
a median response that is negative for most quarters. Finally, Figure 1B also shows that, for the
parameters range considered, the sign of the response of inﬂation and the short-term interest
rate in the nominal rigidities model is a priori indeterminate as well. However, both variables
always move in the same direction on impact, implying a positive correlation in the ﬁrst quarter
at least. The intuition for these results is straightforward. In the case of the RBC model, e.g.
as argued by Francis and Ramey [2003], whether the response of hours worked is positive to
a TFP technology shock depends on the strength of the investment adjustment costs and of the
consumption habit formation. Precisely, the more relevant the latter two frictions, the less the
representative agent will ﬁnd convenient to raise investment and consumption in response to
the increased productivity, and thus the only way to beneﬁt from the shock will be to work less
and enjoy more leisure. Conversely, as ﬁrst stressed by Dotsey [1999], in the case of the model
with nominal rigidities, the systematic response of monetary policy is a further determinant of
the response of hours. Namely, the more technology shock are accommodated with a monetary
17 For instance this can occur because of parameter values implying singularity of some of the matrices of the
model’s state space representation. In addition, since several parameterizations of the monetary policy rule in the
nominal rigidities economy may transpire into local indeterminacy of the steady state, we discard draws that imply
local indeterminacy. Clearly, in the presence of sunspots any exercise in identiﬁcation of impulse responses to
orthogonal shocks would be rather meaningless. See Lubik and Schorfheide [2004] for an estimated DSGE model
that allows for indeterminacy arising from the monetary policy rule.20
easing and a drop in interest rates, the more positive the response of labor inputs and output,
other things equal.
What about investment efﬁciency shocks? In Figures 1C and 1D we report the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of the impulse responses to a 1 percent positive shock to ²i
t. Figure 1C shows that, in
a model without nominal rigidities, these shocks have radically different implications for many
variables, relative to the neutral technology shock. In particular, in the face of an investment and
output increase triggered by a rise in hours worked, they bring about a decline of consumption
and labor productivity in the ﬁrst few quarters. Interestingly, this occurs notwithstanding the
fact that the model features variable capacity utilization, so that all these variables could in
principle increase when hours increase.
Conversely, Figure1Dshowsalessclear-cutpictureforthe(NR)modelwithnominalrigidi-
ties. An expansionary response of systematic monetary policy may bring about an increase in
both investment and consumption on impact, by appropriately inducing a magniﬁed increase
in hours worked. However, since the beneﬁt of forgoing current consumption for a higher in-
vestment level in the presence of such a shock is generally quite high, the median response of
consumption remains always negative, and its maximum response (the 97.5 percentile), though
marginallypositivefortheﬁrstcoupleofquarters, subsequentlybecomesnegative—incontrast
with the dynamic effects of a neutral technology shock displayed in Figure 1B.
Therefore, given the uniform distribution of parameter values in Table 1, there is a unique set
of restrictions that allow to disentangle these two shocks in the data, independent of the pres-
ence of nominal rigidities, as the TFP technology shock entails a more persistent increase in
both consumption and investment. Although such a positive comovement could be intuitively
brought about by a very expansionary monetary stance in the face of an investment-speciﬁc
shock, this kind of systematic policy response is quite unlikely when a standard monetary re-
action function like (7) is assumed. Since, however, it is conceivable that modiﬁcations in the
form of the Taylor rule we consider may better capture the reality of the operation of monetary
policy in the face of this kind of shocks, in Section 5 we will thoroughly assess the implications
of this issue for our empirical ﬁndings.18
From the above analysis of the theoretical impulse responses clearly emerges that, given the
class of DSGE models that we consider under the assumed densities of structural parameters,
the set of sign restrictions that we impose allow us to unambiguously disentangle (neutral)
technology shocks from other shocks a priori. Precisely, the effects of a neutral technology
shock could be separated not only from those of an investment efﬁciency shock, but also from
those of an expansionary monetary policy shock. The latter would bring about a persistent
18 As a similar result may hold for shocks to a capital income tax, we will address this possibility in Section 5
as well.21
decline in the interest rate and an increase in inﬂation, inducing a negative comovement between
these two variables. In contrast, they always move in the same direction on impact following a
technology shock, as shown in Figure 1B.19
Given these results, we broadly interpret uncertainty over structural parameters as being
consistent with the requirement that a positive technology shock increases labor productivity for
the ﬁrst 20 quarters, investment and output for the ﬁrst 10 quarters, real wages for 17 quarters
from the 3rd to the 20th, and consumption for the ﬁrst 5 quarters, as summarized in Table 2.
The response of hours, inﬂation and the short-term interest rate are left unrestricted. This is the
set of restrictions on the signs of the impulse responses that are imposed in the VAR analysis
below.20 Since we include inﬂation and the short-term interest rate in our empirical analysis, it
is natural to focus on the implications of the model with nominal rigidities. In addition, these
implications are also less restrictive and thus more general than those implied by the model with
only real frictions. For instance, the latter implies a very tight link between the responses of
the real wage and labor productivity, that instead is not borne out in the model with nominal
rigidities, as clearly emerges comparing Figure 1A with 1B.21
4 VAR evidence on technology shocks with sign restrictions
In this section, we begin by specifying the variables that enter in the VAR and the number of
lags. We then proceed in illustrating the results on impulse responses and variance decom-
positions to technology shocks obtained for the U.S. economy, as well as conducting some
sensitivity analysis. The variables that we include in the VAR are the logarithm of hourly labor
productivity, real wages, per capita hours worked, per capita real investment, per capita real
consumption, the quarterly gross inﬂation rate (based on the GDP deﬂator), all seasonally ad-
justed, and the quarterly gross short-term interest rate over the sample period going from 1955:1
19 Importantly, we can also rule out confusion with price markup shocks, which, according to Gal´ ı and Ra-
banal [2004] estimates, play an important role in driving the procyclicality of hours worked. Under the assumed
uniform densities, this kind of shocks implies that the difference between labor productivity and the real wage be
persistently negative, whereas it is positive, at least on impact, after a positive technology shock. When we add
the latter requirement to the restrictions in Table 2, the estimated impulse responses are virtually indistinguishable
from those reported in Figure 2.
20 We also investigated whether in the model the imposition of this set of sign restrictions, implying positive
comovements among several variables, would constrain the behavior of hours worked, ﬁnding that the latter’s
response is broadly similar to that reported in Figures 1A-1B.
21 In a previous version of the paper we also considered the more restrictive, RBC-consistent sign restrictions.
The results were broadly similar. See the working paper version.22
to 2003:4. Based on likelihood methods, we choose 3 lags, although results would be virtually
unchanged with 4 lags.22
4.1 The dynamic effects of technology shocks in the U.S. economy
The estimated impulse responses to a positive technology shock obtained under the restrictions
in Table 2 for the United States, and the associated variance decomposition, are presented in
Figures 2 and 3. In each case the Figures show the median (the thick, solid line) and the 5th,
16th, 84th and 95th percentiles (the dashed lines) of the pointwise distribution of the variables
responses, obtained from 500 draws from the unitary hypersphere S7 for each of 1000 draws
from the posterior distribution of the reduced form of the VAR. Output per capita is constructed
by adding up the responses of labor productivity and total hours worked, per capita.
The results presented in Figures 2 and 3 are based on around 35000 different impulse vectors
aj identiﬁed out of the total of 500000 draws.23 Figure 2 shows that a positive technology shock
determines a sizable increase in labor productivity, the real wage, consumption, investment and
output that is also quite persistent: the 16th percentile of the responses of these variables is
generally above zero even after 4 full years. The increase in investment is between 2 and 4
times larger than that of output. The response of consumption, generally less strong than that
of output, is much more persistent than the assumed 5 quarters, displaying a pattern broadly
similar to that of output. While the median response of labor productivity remains pretty much
around the level on impact, that of the other variables displays more of a hump shape, reaching a
maximumafewquartersafter theimpact andthen declining, more fastin thecaseof investment.
The maximum median response of consumption and output occurs after around 2 years.
Concerning the variables whose responses are left unconstrained by our identifying assump-
tions, a clear-cut result is obtained for hours worked. The median response of this variable is
also positive and hump shaped, reaching a peak between 5 and 8 quarters after impact, and
approaching zero by the 5-year horizon. Around its peak, this response is positive with over 0.8
22 A detailed description of the data and its sources can be found in the Data Appendix. The ﬁrst ﬁve variables
are the same as those used by Francis and Ramey [2003] in their U.S. study. Conversely, in its largest, ﬁve variable
system Gal´ ı [1999] includes, beside the ratio of GDP to total hours worked and total hours worked, our last two
nominal variables and a monetary aggregate.
23 The shapes of the distributions of the impulse responses are extremly robust to increasing the number of
draws from both the posterior distribution of the reduced form VAR and the vector q from the unitary hypersphere.
On average, we ﬁnd that around 7% of the candidate impulse vectors satisfy the sign restrictions (37 out of 500
draws). Moreover, we never reject any of the 1000 draws from the VAR reduced-form posterior for lack of ﬁnding
impulse vectors consistent with the sign restrictions.23
probability in each single period for 6 quarters. This ﬁnding stands out against the fall estimated
in the VAR literature studying technology shocks — with the notable exception of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003]. This is most apparent from Table 3, reporting the probabil-
ity of hours worked being at a given horizon. Clearly, it shows that this probability is 0.8 for the
ﬁrst year after the shock, increasing to over 0.9 for the ﬁrst 2 years.
Conversely, the effects of technology shocks on the short-term nominal interest rate and
inﬂation in the U.S. appear largely inconclusive. While the response of inﬂation is more likely
to be slightly negative in the ﬁrst few quarters, with more than a 4/5 probability one quarter
after impact, that of the interest rate is basically zero, with equal probability of being either
positive or negative. This ﬁnding seems to be consistent with our view that both systematic and
unsystematic monetary policy are not playing a big role in shaping our results. However, we
will explore further this issue in the next subsection and in Section 5.
What are the implications of our estimates in terms of the contribution of the technology
shockstoaggregateﬂuctuations? Weaddressthisissuebycomputingthepercentofthevariance
of the k-step ahead forecast error that is accounted for by technology shocks. We ﬁnd that (i)
technology shocks cannot be ruled out as an important driving force of business cycles, and
(ii) yet, to account for the bulk of cyclical ﬂuctuations in hours worked (and inﬂation, interest
rates), would require considering other sources of economic disturbances. In this latter respect,
our results do not seem dissimilar from those obtained with long-run restrictions.
Figure 3 presents the variance decomposition results at horizons up to 40 quarters, also re-
porting the median and the pointwise 68 and 90 percent error bands. We see that technology
shocks can explain up to over 50 percent of the variability in labor productivity, output, con-
sumption, investment and real wages up to 5 years, although it must be noted that there is a large
degree of uncertainty around these estimates. For longer horizons this fraction remains around
50 percent for most variables, with the notable exception of investment. The median fraction,
however, is always lower and generally included between 20 and 30 percent. These shocks are
very unlikely to come close to explaining 100 percent of the variability of labor productivity at
any horizon, thus casting some doubts on identiﬁcation strategies that exclusively rely on this
kind of assumptions.24
The explained fraction of variability in hours is generally below 40 percent with 95 percent
probability, with a median of around 5-10 percent only. Strikingly, this ﬁnding is pretty much
in line with the results reported in Gal´ ı [1999] and Francis and Ramey [2003]. In this respect,
it appears likely that the bulk of movements in hours should reﬂect shocks different from those
affecting technology. However, this fact, i.e. that other shocks than technology shocks would
24 As shown by Fisher [2002] investment speciﬁc shocks may play an important role in accounting for some of
the unexplained variation in labour productivity.24
be needed to account for important features of labor markets at business cycle frequency, has
been well known to represent a major challenge to RBC theory, since the early contributions of
Kydland [1984] and Christiano and Eichenbaum [1992].
Finally, turning to nominal variables, Figure 3 shows that the contribution of technology
shocks to the forecast error variance of inﬂation and especially the short-term interest rate is
generally quite limited, with a somehow higher ceiling in the short-run, at most up to 40 percent,
falling to below 30 percent in the long run.25
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we investigate to what extent the above results are robust to the following
three features of our procedure: (i) the inclusion of the variables in the VAR in levels; (ii) the
adoption of a Bayesian approach with a joint diffuse prior on the VAR reduced form coefﬁcients
and the covariance matrix of the residuals; (iii) the assumption of no structural change in the
sample. Wethinktheﬁrsttwochecksareimportantinlightofthecontroversyontheappropriate
modelling of the time-series properties of the variables that has surrounded the identiﬁcation of
technology shocks with long-run restrictions. This may raise the legitimate concern that the
two assumptions above be a source of bias of our results toward ﬁnding a positive response of
hours worked.26 Moreover, authors like Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es [2003], among others,
have argued that systematic monetary policy may have changed after 1979, and that resulted in
a structural change in VARs parameters and in the effects of technology shocks, especially on
hours worked. Therefore we also examine the subsample stability of our results to changes in
the U.S. monetary policy regime.27
As shown below, our ﬁndings turn out to be quite robust to all these checks. Running
our estimation with all real variables in ﬁrst differences not only does not change our results,
but actually leads to an even higher probability of a positive, persistent response of hours to a
technology shock. Likewise, our results are not driven by the form of the prior on the VAR
reduced form parameters and are robust across the two subsamples considered.
25 In contrast, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003] ﬁnd that technology shocks identiﬁed with long-
run restrictions account for over 60 percent of the one step ahead forecast error variance of inﬂation, and almost
40 percent at even the 20 quarter horizon.
26 SeePhillips[1991]onhowdiffuse, “uninformative”priorscaneffectivelyturnouttoimplystrongrestrictions
on posterior estimates in the case of nonstationary time series.
27 Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler [2000] show that monetary policy became more responsive to changes in expected
inﬂation in the Volcker-Greenspan period; a similar result is obtained by Cogley and Sargent [2003]. On the other
hand Sims and Zha [2004] ﬁnd that changes in the variances of structural shocks are the major source of instability
in a VAR including the main U.S. macroeconomic variables.25
4.2.1 Level vs difference speciﬁcation
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003] show that the ﬁndings in Gal´ ı [1999] are turned
on their head when per capita hours worked are treated as a stationary process rather than as
a difference stationary process. This result has been conﬁrmed by Francis and Ramey [2003]
and Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004] with VARs speciﬁcations including variables different from those
originally used by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003]. Since our VAR in levels can
be viewed as extending that estimated in ﬁrst differences by Francis and Ramey [2003], for it
appends to their ﬁve-variable speciﬁcation inﬂation and nominal interest rates, it is natural to
ask whether our results are also sensitive to our assumption that all variables enter the VAR in
levels.
We therefore applied our methodology to a VAR for the U.S. in which labor productivity,
hours worked, consumption, investment and the real wage are in ﬁrst differences, as in Francis
and Ramey [2003]. The impulses responses presented in Figure 4, obtained with the same
procedure as in Figure 2, show not only that our previous ﬁndings are broadly independent of
the way variables in the VAR are modelled, but actually they come out stronger with this ﬁrst
difference speciﬁcation. Technology shocks have a more persistent effect on labor productivity,
real wages, consumption and investment, quite likely to be permanent. The 5th percentiles
of the distribution of all these variables is now positive for the whole horizon. Remarkably,
a similar behavior is displayed by hours worked, which are now even more likely than in the
level speciﬁcation to increase after a positive technology shock. The median response is always
positive, gradually increasing from impact to around 0.4 percent. The probability of an increase
in hours worked exceeds 4/5 from the 4th quarter on. Finally, the responses of inﬂation and the
short-term interest rate is indistinguishable from that illustrated in Figure 2.28
Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004] raise a further concern on the robustness to the VAR speciﬁcation,
arguing that the reversal in the response of labor inputs to a technology shock documented by
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003] between the level and difference speciﬁcation is
due to a distortion in their estimated short-run responses, as a consequence of the presence of a
spuriouslowfrequencycorrelationbetweenlaborproductivitygrowthandtotalpercapitahours.
Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004] show that the response of labor inputs is always negative regardless
of the transformation when total hours worked are used without a normalization by working
age population. Therefore, to make sure that our framework is unaffected by this criticism, we
carried out another experiment replacing per capita hours with total hours worked in both the
28 Another experiment run with hours, inﬂation and the interest rate in levels, and all other variables in ﬁrst
differences, yielded very similar results. Namely, the response of hours worked was more persistent and more
likely to be positive for a longer period than with the benchmark level speciﬁcation.26
level- and difference- speciﬁcation VARs. As results are very similar to those presented above,
for the sake of brevity we do not report them here. The key ﬁnding, however, is that the response
of hours worked is more likely to be positive for even a longer period than with the benchmark
speciﬁcation.
Overall, these results show that, in stark contrast to the VAR-based literature on technology
shocks, our ﬁndings are robust to the level or ﬁrst difference speciﬁcation of the VAR. This
lends strong support to our view that theory-based sign restrictions are helpful in avoiding a
great deal of the subtle speciﬁcation issues that arise when long run restrictions are used.
4.2.2 Results from the maximum-likelihood estimates
Given that the level speciﬁcation does not introduce any bias in our procedure, as a further
check in this subsection we report results abstracting from the (diffuse) prior on the reduced
form parameters of the VAR, and just consider only the uncertainty on the identiﬁcation of
the technology shocks. Precisely, we keep the values of the VAR parameters ﬁxed at their
OLS-Maximum Likelihood estimates and draw a large number of candidate impulse response
vectors, discarding those that do not satisfy the sign restrictions in Table 2.
This exercise should highlight any bias in favor of estimating a positive response of labor
inputs potentially introduced in the VAR posterior distribution by our diffuse prior, in case the
latter was dominating the data likelihood. Given our interest in impulse responses, it is not
immediately clear whether a prior that is diffuse over the VAR reduced form coefﬁcients could
be actually giving more weights to particular impulse response coefﬁcients.
Figure 5 displays the estimated impulse responses of the variables in our system to a tech-
nology shock obtained from the OLS estimates of the VAR in levels and from drawing 50000
candidate impulse vectors from S7. As before, we report the median (the thick, solid line) and
the 5th, 16th, 84th and 95th percentiles (the dashed lines) of the pointwise distribution of the
accepted impulse responses.
The key result is as follows. All impulse responses are quite similar to those displayed in
Figure 2. Fixing the VAR parameters and abstracting from the uncertainty on their estimation
only makes the band between the 5th and the 95th percentiles slightly narrower. This shows that
the posterior distribution from which we draw the realizations of the VAR reduced form coefﬁ-
cients is actually quite concentrated around the OLS-ML estimates, mainly reﬂecting the likeli-
hood shape. Therefore, the prevailing source of dispersion in our estimated impulse responses
clearly reﬂects the multiplicity of impulse vectors that satisfy our sign restrictions, qualifying
as technology shocks. It is thus remarkable that they lead to quite deﬁnite conclusions on the
response of hours worked to technology shocks.27
4.2.3 Subsample stability
In this subsection we brieﬂy discuss subsample stability of our speciﬁcation. Gal´ ı, L´ opez-
Salido and Vall´ es [2003] have found that the effects of technology shocks estimated with long-
restrictions differ drastically between the two periods before and after Volcker’s tenure at the
helm of the Federal Reserve System. Precisely, a positive technology shock identiﬁed as in Gal´ ı
[1999] brings about a decline in hours worked in the subsample up to the early 1980’s, and a rise
afterwards, because of the kind of systematic monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve
System in the two subperiods. Due to the inclusion of inﬂation and the short-term interest rate
in our VAR, our sample is actually different from those originally used by Gal´ ı [1999] and
Francis and Ramey [2003], giving relatively more weight to the second sample used by Gal´ ı,
L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es [2003]. Here therefore we assess the robustness of our conclusions to
the possibility of subsample instability.
Figures 6A and 6B present the estimated impulse responses of the variables in our system to
a technology shock for the pre-1979 and post-1983 sample periods respectively, obtained using
the same algorithm as in Figure 2.29 As before, each ﬁgure shows the median (the thick, solid
line) and the usual percentiles (the dashed lines) of the pointwise distribution in the indicated
subsample.
The following results stand out. First, the qualitative patterns of all variables responses are
broadly similar across both periods and to those estimated in the full sample. In particular,
hours worked rise in a hump-shaped pattern in both subsamples. Interestingly, this increase
appears to be slightly more likely in the early period, in which the 5th percentile is now positive
from the 5th to the 12th quarter after the shock. Second, in the late period, the estimated effects
of technology appear somehow smaller relative to the earlier period. For instance, the median
response of labor productivity is always below 0.4 percent, whereas it close to 0.5 percent in the
ﬁrst few quarters in the earlier subsample. This is consistent with the well-documented drop in
aggregate volatility in the last two decades.30
This evidence, similar to that obtained by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003]
with long-run restrictions, is consistent with the view that the responses in the subperiods are
the same as they are for the full sample and there is no break in the response of the interest rate
and inﬂation to technology shocks. In particular, although in the ﬁrst subsample a drop in the
interest rate is slightly more likely as the median response is deﬁnitely negative for a couple of
29 The sample period ranging from 1979:3 to 1982:4 is avoided because of the nonborrowed targeting regime
adopted by the Federal Reserve, which induced a signiﬁcant increases in the volatility of the Federal funds rate
(see Bernanke and Mihov [1998]).
30 See Stock and Watson [2002], among others. Intriguingly, these authors argue that the decrease in volatility
is mainly due to smaller, less volatile shocks.28
quarters, this does not appear sufﬁcient to reject the hypothesis of no sample break in the VAR
in more formal a way. Nevertheless, the crucial ﬁnding from our perspective is that inference
about the response of hours worked to a technology shock is not affected by subsample stability
issues.
5 Interpreting the results with sign restrictions
In this section we ﬁrst ask whether our results may be due to the fact that our approach mixes
up technology shocks with other shocks that may bring about a more positive response of
hours worked, like monetary policy shocks, investment efﬁciency shocks and capital-income
tax shocks. It should already be clear from our analysis of the theoretical impulse responses
in Section 2 that, given the class of DSGE models we consider under the assumed distribution
of structural parameters, the set of sign restrictions that we impose should allow us to uniquely
disentangle (neutral) technology shocks from other shocks. However, here we take a more
empirical view, showing that our results are quite robust to controlling for interest rate cuts,
changes in capital-income taxes, and to assuming a positive lower bound on the response of
consumption — highly unlikely to be exceeded after an investment efﬁciency shock.
After having shown that our ﬁndings are not likely to be due to mistaken inference caused by
the above sources of misspeciﬁcation, we brieﬂy investigate the reasons why our ﬁndings about
the behavior of hours worked are different relative to most of the VAR literature using long-
run restrictions. Even when we focus on those structural impulse vectors that explain a large
fraction of labor productivity in the long run, we always ﬁnd that hours worked, regardless
of how uncertain their response on impact might be, sharply rise with a hump-shaped pattern.
Moreover, this kind of impulse responses that yield dynamic effects similar to those estimated
with long-run restrictions are also relatively unlikely. Most structural impulse vectors uncover
technology shocks whose long run effects are somehow smaller and less persistent, and bring
about an increase in hours worked within the ﬁrst few quarters.
5.1 Are sign restrictions confusing different shocks?
In this subsection we turn to the task of investigating whether our results may be due to the
fact that our procedure is retrieving not only technology shocks but also other shocks that may
bring about a more positive response of hours worked, mixing up their effects. Obvious candi-
dates are monetary policy shocks, investment efﬁciency shocks and capital-income tax shocks,
given the discussion in Section 2.3. From the analysis of the theoretical impulse responses
clearly emerges that the set of sign restrictions that we impose should allow us to unambigu-29
ously disentangle (neutral) technology shocks from other potentially important shocks a priori.
For instance, while both investment and consumption rise following a shock to total factor
productivity that boosts current output, they will tend to comove negatively in response to an
investment-speciﬁc shock that does not shift the current production function, with consumption
declining. The same reasoning applies to a negative shock to — a fall in — the capital-income
tax, which also increases the cost of current consumption relative to future consumption (in-
vestment), leaving current production possibilities unaffected.
Nevertheless, our goal in this section is to go beyond these theoretical results, and assess
the robustness of our ﬁndings more broadly. For instance, it is possible to write models in
which a monetary expansion brings about a temporary increase in inﬂation because of cost
channel effects, as argued by Barth and Ramey [2002]. Likewise, interactions between real
and nominal frictions, and particularly systematic monetary policy, different from those we
assumed in Section 2, may trigger an increase in consumption in response to an investment-
speciﬁc shock.
Therefore, in order to address these concerns we carried out the following two experiments.
First, in order to unequivocally rule out confusion with monetary policy shocks we redid our
empirical analysis imposing the further restriction that after the shock the nominal interest be
positive. Second, we checked the sensitivity of our inference on the behavior of hours to the
requirement of a large and positive bound on the response of consumption, and to controlling
for capital-income tax changes. Again, across all these experiments our results turn out to
be broadly unaffected, thus conﬁrming their robustness beyond the narrower validity of the
assumptions underlying our analysis.
Monetary policy. In our ﬁrst experiment, we complemented the restrictions in Table 2 with
the requirement that the interest rate be positive for the ﬁrst 2 quarters following the shock. This
way it should be very unlikely that our identiﬁcation strategy mistakenly picks expansionary
monetary policy shocks for technology shocks.
Figure 7 presents the relevant results, again reporting the usual percentiles of the point by
point distribution of the impulse responses. It is clear that the impulse responses are very similar
to those depicted in Figure 2 with no restrictions on the short-term interest rate — obviously
barring the latter’s response. In particular, hours worked, if anything, are slightly more likely to
increase immediately under this speciﬁcation, as the 16th percentile hovers very close to zero
for the ﬁrst 10 quarters.
This evidence has at least two noteworthy implications. Not only does it strongly support
the contention that our identiﬁcation strategy does not mix up technology and monetary policy
shocks, but it also suggests that our ﬁndings are difﬁcult to rationalize in terms of other kinds of30
shocks — like an investement-speciﬁc technology shock — accompanied by an expansionary
monetary policy stance that makes their effects look similar to those of a technology shock.31
Shocks to the consumption-investment transformation rate. Notwithstanding the above
observation, we carried out an experiment aimed at uncovering a possible inﬂuence on our re-
sults of disturbances affecting the rate of transformation between consumption and investment.
In particular we added to the benchmark list of restrictions the requirement that consumption be
not only positive for 5 quarters, but also larger than the 16th percentile of its estimated response
reported in Figure 2. The idea is that a relatively large response of consumption is very unlikely
to be consistent with an investment-efﬁciency shock.
The results, reported in Figure 8, are again in broad support of our overall ﬁndings. Ef-
fectively, requiring a more pronounced positive response of consumption makes the increase in
hours worked even larger. The 5th percentile is now positive from the 5th to the 10th quarter.
Moreover, theresponsesoftheothervariablesarebarelyaffected, especiallythoseofinvestment
and the nominal short-term interest rate. In light also of the above evidence on the quite limited
role that systematic monetary policy plays in shaping our results, if our approach was confus-
ing different kinds of technology shocks with opposite effects on hours worked, the stronger
response of consumption would have to be associated with a more negative response of hours
worked, rather than a more positive one.32 We also veriﬁed that including consumption durables
in investment and leaving only nondurables in consumption proper did not change our ﬁndings.
Results are available upon request.
Our last exercise was to examine the robustness of our results to capital-income tax shocks.
Following Francis and Ramey [2003], we tackled this problem by constructing a series for
the capital tax rate shock (as in Jones [2002]), and included it as an exogenous variable when
estimating the reduced form VAR, before imposing the sign restrictions in Table 2. Since our
results are again unaffected, to save on space we do not report them here. We also computed the
correlation between our estimates of technology shocks in the U.S., across all identiﬁcations,
and the AR(1) innovations to the series of the capital tax rate, interpreted by Jones [2002] as tax
shocks. This correlation is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
31 We also run an experiment requiring, in addition to the restrictions in Table 2, that inﬂation and the interest
rate have the same sign for 2 quarters after the shock, as prescribed by the model with nominal rigidities. The
results of this experiment, available upon request, conﬁrm and actually even strengthen our original ﬁndings.
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5.2 Exploring the long-run effects of technology shocks
As mentioned above, in contrast to standard structural VAR analyses, relying on just- or over-
identifying restrictions to estimate a unique impulse vector that maps reduced form residuals
into structural shocks one-to-one, our procedure yields a number of impulse vectors that have
a structural interpretation. Thus, a useful starting point to understand the differences between
our ﬁndings and those in the literature using long-run restrictions is to ask whether among
those structural impulse vectors there is any subset that is associated with large and permanent
effects. Obviously, there should be in principle just one, if any, impulse vector that accounts
for all variation in labor productivity in the — however deﬁned — “long run”. Nevertheless,
an advantage of our approach is that it allows to assess if quantitative changes in the amount
of variation in labor productivity explained at a given distant horizon are reﬂected in qualitative
changesinimpulseresponses. Therefore, amongthesetofstructuralimpulsevectorsthatsatisfy
our sign restrictions, we selected those that account for over 70 percent of the forecast error
variance of labor productivity after 10 years— i.e., the “long run” in this exercise is meant to
be 40 quarters — rather than focusing on just one of them.33 Given the results in Section 4.2.2,
for simplicity the candidate impulse vectors were computed with the parameters of the reduced
form VAR for the U.S. held constant at their OLS-ML estimates.
Figure 9 presents the usual ﬁve percentiles. The key results are as follows. First, the dis-
tributions are generally much less dispersed than those reported in Figure 5, for less than 5
percent of the impulse vectors exceed the 70 percent threshold, as should also be clear from the
ﬁndings on variance decomposition in Section 4.1. However, for labor productivity, real wages,
investment, inﬂation and the interest rate, the dispersion regarding the effects on the ﬁrst couple
of quarters is still substantial. The short-run effects on consumption and hours are instead rather
tightly estimated. Therefore, the dispersion of the responses does not seem to depend only on
whether a sign restriction is imposed on the speciﬁc variable.
Second, the dynamic effects of the shock on labor productivity, real wages, output, con-
sumption and investment appear indisputably permanent, similarly to those estimated with
long-run restrictions. Interestingly, however, the maximum fraction explained by the candi-
date shocks never exceeds 85 percent at the 10-year horizon. All these variables responds
positively on impact and then rise reaching a new long run level. Output, consumption and
investment display a marked hump-shaped pattern, peaking around 10 quarters after the shock,
before converging from above to the new level.
Third, the impact response of the unrestricted variables, i.e. hours worked, inﬂation and the
33 Results below are reasonably robust to changes in the 40 quarters horizon or the 70 percent variance decom-
position threshold.32
interest is now clear-cut: they all fall. Inﬂation and the short-term interest rate remain negative
for 3 and 10 years, respectively. By contrast, hours worked strongly rise with a hump-shaped
pattern, becoming positive after 5 quarters and peaking around 3 years at roughly 0.4 percent,
to return to the baseline value only very slowly. Most importantly, this increase is such that the
correlation at business cycle frequencies between the technology component of hours worked
and output in the data — extracted using the band pass ﬁlter suggested by Baxter and King
[1999] — is positive and signiﬁcant, on average equal to 0.60. This result is clearly in contrast
with the ﬁndings of Gal´ ı and Rabanal [2004] in a similar exercise based on long-run restrictions
(see Figure 3 in their paper).
Our procedure thus recovers a subset of impulse responses implying dynamic effects that
are very similar to those obtained by means of long-run restrictions. Nevertheless, in line with
the results in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson [2003], these permanent shocks still lead
to a signiﬁcant increase in hours, though with a few quarters delay. The level speciﬁcation of
hours, however, cannot be all the story, as should be clear from Section 4.2.1, unquestionably
showing that our results are independent of whether the VAR is estimated in levels or ﬁrst dif-
ferences. There is another important message that stems from the impulse vectors identiﬁed by
our procedure and not included in Figure 9. Across all the identiﬁcation schemes satisfying the
sign restrictions, those associated with the large, permanent effects reported in the ﬁgure ac-
count only for a fraction, though important, of all possible ones. The vast majority of structural
impulse vectors imply that a positive technology shock has somehow smaller and less persistent
effects in the long run, but brings about an increase in hours worked in the ﬁrst few quarters.
This ﬁnding is more in line with the RBC tradition, in which technology shocks are usually
assumed to be very persistent but trend stationary. Interestingly, the different initial effect on
hours worked may be easily rationalized with the different size and persistence of the two types
of shocks and the implied different wealth and substitution effects on labor supply.34
6 Concluding remarks
This paper identiﬁes technology shocks in VAR models of the United States by means of restric-
tions on the sign of impulse responses, derived from an explicit modelling of the uncertainty
over the parameters of a popular class of dynamic general equilibrium models, encompassing
both nominal and real rigidities. Technology shocks are found to bring about a signiﬁcant and
persistent increase in real wages, consumption, investment and output; hours worked increase
34 See Rotemberg [2003] for an explanation of Gal´ ı’s [1999] ﬁnding in terms of slow diffusion of permanent
technology shocks.33
with a humped-shape pattern. In addition, the view that technology shocks may play a substan-
tial role in accounting for business cycle ﬂuctuations cannot be rejected, although these shocks
leave unexplained most of the variation in hours worked.
This paper has focused on the estimation of impulse responses and variance decompositions
to technology shocks. However, a natural question to ask is whether it would possible to draw
implications on the parameterizations that are more likely to be associated with relevant features
of the density of the estimated impulse responses. This is important as it could shed light on
key aspects of the internal propagation mechanism of DSGE models, e.g., whether the fact that
consequences of a technology shock resemble those in an RBC model might in reality reﬂect
that the actual economy has various nominal frictions, and monetary policy has successfully
mitigated those frictions, as for instance recently argued by Altig et al. [2003]. In this respect,
we obtain two contrasting results. On the one hand, it is clear that, in stark contrast with
the impulses responses of the RBC model, the estimated response of real wages is in general
lower than that of labor productivity — the probability that the former is lower than the latter
exceeds 0.85 on impact. On the other hand, we were unable to ﬁnd any evidence that the well-
documented changes in the systematic conduct of U.S. monetary policy in the last two decades
have had any signiﬁcant effect on the economy’s response to technology shocks.
As the exercise was started out by motivating identifying restrictions on impulse responses
with a set of model economies, a clear advantage of its approach is the clear link between
structural impulse responses and theoretical properties of the models. Therefore, if the (highly
nonlinear) mapping from the model’s parameter space into impulse responses could be inverted,
it would be possible to map the posterior density of impulse responses back into posterior densi-
ties of structural parameters, thus providing a precise answer to the above questions. There are,
however, several nontrivial aspects of this task, due to the fact that we would be trying to form
our inference from a vector-valued function of a vector of parameters, with the dimensionality
of both vectors quite high. Hence, an interesting issue for future research would be to com-
pute the likelihood of a vector of impulse responses and estimate the posterior distribution of
the parameters of the underlying DSGE model, perhaps suitably adapting methods such as the
Sequential Monte Carlo algorithm recently applied to DSGE models by Fern´ andez-Villaverde
and Rubio-Ram´ ırez [2004].Appendix: Description of the data
Labor productivity: index of output per hour, non-farm business sector (Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, BLS)
Hours worked: index of total hours worked, non-farm business sector (BLS)
Real wage: real hourly compensation, non-farm business sector (BLS)
Consumption: personal consumption expenditures, billions of chained (1996) dollars (Bureau
of Economic Analysis, BEA)
Investment: gross private capital formation, billions of chained (1996) dollars (BEA)
Short-term interest rate: Federal funds rate (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
Inﬂation: quarterly changes in the implicit GDP deﬂator (BEA)Tables and ﬁguresTable 1
Parameters ranges
parameter low up mean
b 0.985 0.995 0.99
¾c 1.0 10.0 5.50
¾l 0.0 10.0 5.0
h 0.0 0.8 0.4
Â 0.0 5.0 2.5
»p 0.0 0.8 0.405
°p 0.0 1.0 0.5
»w 0.0 0.8 0.405
°w 0.0 1.0 0.5
¸w 0.0 1.0 0.5
Ã 0.0 50.0 25.0
½r 0.0 0.99 0.495
½y -0.25 0.25 0.0
½¼ 1.1 2.0 1.55
½z 0.75 1.0 0.85
½i 0.75 1.0 0.85Table 2
Sign restrictions on VAR variablesa
Variable Horizon in quarters
lpk ¸ 0 k = 0;:::;19
wk ¸ 0 k = 2;:::;19
ik ¸ 0 k = 0;:::;9
yk ¸ 0 k = 0;:::;9
ck ¸ 0 k = 0;:::;4
Table 3
Probability of a positive response of hours workeda
horizon 1 3 5 9 11 13 15 17 19
probability 0.73 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.53 0.48
aThe impact response is denoted as the response at horizon 0.Figure 1A
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quarters after shockFigure 2
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: Benchmark speciﬁcationa
Labor productivity



















































































aAll variables in levels. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1953:1-
2003:4.Figure 3
Contribution of technology shocks to the variance of the forecast error: Benchmark
speciﬁcationa
Labor productivity




















































































aAll variables in levels. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1953:1-
2003:4.Figure 4
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: difference speciﬁcationa
Labor productivity


















































































aAll variables, except the Federal funds rate and inﬂation, are in ﬁrst differences. Assumed sign restric-
tions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1953:1-2003:4.Figure 5
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: The effect of identiﬁcation uncertainty a
Labor productivity


















































































aAll variables in levels. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1953:1-
2003:4. The reduced form of the VAR and the covariance matrix are ﬁxed at their OLS-ML estimates.Figure 6A
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: Pre-1979:2 perioda
Labor productivity














































































aAll variables in levels. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1953:1-
1979:2.Figure 6B
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: Post-1983:1 perioda
Labor productivity














































































aAll variables in levels. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table 2. Sample period is 1983:1-
2003:4.Figure 7
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: The effect of assuming a positive interest-rate
responsea
Labor productivity























































































aAll variables in levels. Sample period is 19531:1-2003:4. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in
Table 2 with the additional requirement of a positive response of the Federal funds rate in the ﬁrst 2
quarters.Figure 8
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: The effect of assuming a large response of
consumptiona
Labor productivity




















































































aAll variables in levels. Sample period is 1953:1-2003:4. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table
2 with the additional requirement that for the ﬁrst ﬁve quarters the response of real consumption is larger
than the 16 percentile under the benchmark speciﬁcation (see Figure 2).Figure 9
Impulse responses to positive technology shock: The effect of requiring a large contribution to
labor productivity long-run changesa
Labor productivity


















































































aAll variables in levels. Sample period is 1953:1-2003:4. Assumed sign restrictions are reported in Table
2 with the additional requirement that technology shocks account for at least 70 percent of the variance of
the forecast error of labor productivity at 40 quarters. The reduced form of the VAR and the covariance
matrix of the residuals are ﬁxed at their OLS-ML estimates.References
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